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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
1nr,\Nl1~ ROYLANCE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs. -
STEPHEN L. DA VIES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10641 
BRtEF 01'-, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries suffered by 
a guPst arising out of a collision of the host's automobile 
1rith a step] pole. 
DISPOSI'TION OF LOWER COURT 
'f'Jie case \rns tried to a jury in the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District in and for the County of 
rtah. F'rom a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, 
riPft•ndant appeals. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and jurl~ 
ment in his favor as a matter of law, or that faiJj 11 , 
he seeks a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FAC'TS 
On December 25, 1964, at the time the accident ne 
curred, Roylance and Davies had known each othrr fri 1 
about a year and were good personal friends. (R. 10i11 
Roylance worked mostly at night as a bartendrr miri 
Davies had a key to Roylance's apartment whE>rP he eo11Jii 
stay if he wanted to and which he did occasionally. Tl111 
day of the accident was not the first time that Roylan('1 
had ridden with Davies and he had always found hin1 
to be a capable driver. (R. 101) At the time of tl1r 
accident Roylance was employed as a bartender at th' 
Nugget Lounge and he was due at work on the daY rd 
the accident at approximately 5 :30 p.m. (R. 91) 
On the day of the accident it had been storming moit 
of the day; some light snow was falling and the street' 
were wet. (R. 83) Davies picked RJJylance up at about 
2 :00 or 2 :30 p.m. to drive to Orem to visit some friends. 
(R. 48) Their friends were not at home when th~:­
reached Orem so they stopped at the Imperial Lounf1 
in Orem and had two light drinks of whiskey. Prior to 
this time Davies had had nothing to drink that <lai. 
3 
I rt +9) Tl10~' arrived at the Imperial Lounge at 3 :00 p.m. 
and nfter two drinks they left to drive back to Provo 
, 0 tliat Roylanee could go to work at the Nugget. As 
tJJ('Y drove past the Nugget, located north of Provo on 
[ _;-.,_ Higlrway 91, the boss or whoever was to open 
up had not yet come so Roylance and Davies decided to 
drive' over to the Veterans' Club for a few minutes to 
11 ait. They stayed at the Veterans' Club for one quarter 
lo one half an hour. (R. 50) While at the Veterans' Club, 
fl:wies had one drink which he did not finish. 
Th<' V etPrans' Club in Provo is located on Colum-
liia Lane. AftPr they had been there just a short time, 
tl1Py ld't to take Roylance to work. rrhey proceeded on 
Colmubia Lane down to Riverside Avenue and turned 
1·ast up Riverside Avenue toward U.S. Highway 91 which 
run~ generally north and south. (R. 51) As they ap-
proad1Pd the intersection of Riverside A venue and U. S. 
lliglnrny 91, they noticed that the traffic was heavy in 
both dirediom; along the highway. (R. 56) Davies pulled 
11p and stopped at tlw stop sign at the intersection. 
IR. 9:1) 
At tJ1is intersection Riverside A venue intersects the 
highway at approximately a sixty degree a.ngle. The high-
\\'1>. traffic lines are painted with two four-inch yellow 
li11rs on t•ach side of a four-foot median in the center. The 
l1ig-Jrn a.\' has two traveling lanes in each direction. There 
;, a Lrt-ak in the lines at the Riverside A venue inter-
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sPrtion. ( H. -1-0) Tlw two son th hound trav<>ling lam.'" 
Pach 11 fr<>t in wi<lth, makinµ: a total of' 2~ f<•d and rr, 
tlw west<•1·11 eclw· of thP southhouIHl trnv<•ling lmw to ,
1 
cnrh is an aclditional :)() fr>Pt, making tlw eurh a di~ltn 
of 52 ft><>t from thP r<•nt<•r of th<' highway. (R. 3\ ., 
Stet>! strPd light poles lll'<' approxi111atP].\· 1;) fppt fo, 
the enrh on thP west sid(' of tlw higlrn«1:· and app 111 ,. 
rnately tlw same distaJH'P from th<' "'<'St <'<lg<' 111· \) 
sonthhonnd travPlinp: Ian<>. 
To n'arh tlH' ?\up:g<'tt it was nC'r<•ssar:· to trn1, 
north from this intenwrtion approximat<'ly -100 fret .. \1 
tt>r ohserving the lwav:· traffic in hoth direction, r 
the highway, DaviPs dPeidecl not to rrnss thP higlrn:1 
hut rather to drive along the west side of thP 11iglrni1 
sine<=' he int<~ndPd to hny gas at R<'Pd's S<'rvie<' ~tni;,,, 
locat<>d just south of th<> .'.'\uggd and drnp Roylm1r1• tl11! 
Tlwrefore, 110 made a IP ft-hand tnrn off Riversich• A w1rn 
ancl iiroePPclt•d np tlw \Y<'st si<lc> of tlw highwny. ( f? .. ·,. 
DaviPs had purrhas<>d gas frnm Re<•d's 8erviri> :'1:· 
tion many times prior to this aeci<l<>nt. (Ii. :i:)) 11 
normal rontP in traveling from hi:s hmnp to Heed's ~ 1 'J\ 
ice Station was to e011w do\\·n Columhia Larn•, turn' 
up Riversid<> A venue and then north along the \\'t>~t ,id 
of the hip;hway to the sPrvirP station. (H. /()) DaYi,, 
\\·as familiar with th<' particular section of t1H' road' 
the west of tlw higlrn·ay. (R. 5:l) This ai·<'a wa:-; l'l'[1ii' 
atecl from tlw sonthhomH1 tnwe1inp: larn's of t11(• lii~i 
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1., :i.i a11d \\'as ustid extensivtily for vehicular traffic in 
:::id nni of' tlw husines:-ws to the side of the highway. 
! !?. '-;/) 
Prior to the accident he had driven on this west 
-:li11uld('r in both directions and knew of the light posts. 
1 ]{. j-J.) HPPd's Service Station is approximately 100 f Pet 
l1e.rn11d wlwrp the aceidPnt occurred. (R. 71) 
Thr rnad surface between thP face of the curb and 
tlH· soutltllonnd lanes of the highway was gravel and dirt. 
1 n. 7:2) The good asphalt surface of the highway ex-
t('nde<l to ahont tlw street light portion of the road. (R. 
''.ii) Th<' accident occurred at approximately the south 
ei1rnPr of tlw (:ommercial Tire Building. Reed's Service 
:-;tation iR th<~ next building to the north and the next 
l:11ilding to the north of Reed's is the Nugget Lounge 
wh1·rc• Ho)'lanc0 worked. (R. 87, Ex. P-1) 
'l'Jip alternative to using the west side of the high-
11·n» was to make a left turn onto the highway, travel 
11111 U1 to tlw next break in the center lirn• which ·was WPil 
li1".rnnd the Nugget, make a "U" turn and double back 
c;nntl1 to HPed's Service Station. (R. 41) Riverside Aw-
nn1· as it approached the intersection with the highway 
"ac<. np grad<• from approximately the markPt on the cor-
"''i !o tliP stop sign. Riverside Avenue was paved hut 
1i1 1·re was lomw gTavel on tlw top of it. 
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antomohil0 around a <'11l'VP at a hiµ;h rat<· of SJH'<'<l ('aii; 
ing tlw antomohile to OYPrturn. In clisrnssing t} 1p l'a>· 
this court accPph'd tlw instructions conc·<•rning wi1lfni 
miscondnet given l1y tlH· trial eourt whieh \\·pn•: 
"The trial conrt, in its instrurtion No. 7 i], 
fined willful misconduct as 'the intentional doi 11 , 
of an act or intentional omitting- or failing to i),, 
an act, \Vith knowh•clg<• that serious injmy i~ :1 
probable and not merPly a possihlP result, or th1 
intentional doing of an act with wanton and n·<-k 
less disregard of the possihl<:' conseq1wnePs. I: 
involves deliberak intentional or wanton eond1M 
in doing or omitting to do an act \\·ith knm\\1·cb 
or appreciation that injury is likel_v to resul1 
th<:'refrom.' 'J1he jury was further im;trnefrd i11 
instruction No.() that 'willful misconduct connot~; 
a greater wrongdoing than nwn• iwµ;ligen<·1· 111 
PVen gross nPgligPm'<'. It ineludes a comwiou~ 111 
intentional violation of <h•finite law or ml" 11t 
conduct with the knowledge of th<' 1wril to :JI 
apprt>hPnOP(l from s1wh a«t or failnr<' to net." 
Ricciitti v. Ro7Finson, 2 1Ttah :2d +3, :2(i!J P.2d ~.~~ 
( 195.+) followed th<:' hm;ie inh•rpretation of willl'11l rni~­
ronduct as was usl-'d in thP Stack cas<', s11pra. 
In the Ricci11ti ease, plaintiff and a girl friPn<l rnd 
defrndant and his friend at a tavnn ahont rnid11i!.il1t. 
and after making a round of sc'veral sueh places, anil 
at about 3 :30 a.m. the dl-'f Pndant drnvP th<-' party ow1 
a canyon road to a dam and rC'tnrn to tlw city. 1'11" 
morning \Vas dark, and although tlwre was no snmr 11n 
the streets, tlwy '"er<:' wd and a light snow was fnlliu: 
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rrorc('(ling through a residential district where the speed 
limit was :·)() m.p.h., and while the sleeping girl in the 
f'rnnt. sPat had her head in defendant's lap, a lighted 
(' 1garette fell from the later's mouth into the folds of 
Jwr clothing and in attempting to rid himself of it and 
11 Jule sparks were flying, defendant lost control of his 
car. lt jmnprd the curb, traveled along the lawned park-
ing 19:2 feet, jumped several other driveway curbs, side-
~ mpPd 2 trPr::;, knocking the rear door off, returned to 
the highway and traveled another 183 feet before being 
~towed. There \Yas evidence that defendant at one point 
on the parking applied his brakes, but there was no evi-
df'n<·e of brake marks on the street either before the car 
.imuped tht.• curb or after it returned to the street. Over 
objcC'tion, a policeman was allowed to give his opinion 
that tl1P car was traveling at about 60 m.p.h. 
The plaintiff testified that defendant drove very 
r:wpfulJy down the canyon, and that at the time of the 
nc·rident sht- had no complaint as to the manner in which 
he \\as driving, and that she didn't think he was doing 
an?thing wrong. rrhere was no evidence that any of the 
othP1 O('('Upants at any time complained of defendant's 
rlriving-. 
'J1lw rTtah Supreme Court said at 283: 
"Under the facts of this case, a reasonable 
rwrson could not conclude that defendant inten-
tionally did or failed to do an act that would fall 
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within this definition. rrlwse rwople w0re fri(•]](), 
There is no fact or combination of fads in t1i~ 
record which showed a ·wanton or recklt·ss (Ji, 
regard of the conseqn<'nces, \Yhich in this ('ai1 
were a loss of control due solely to the accidt>nlai 
dropping of a lighted cigarette in the defendant'., 
clothing and the car jumping the curh when di."-
fendant tried to dispofw of the lighted ci(ran·tli 
' I"'> ' 
The fact that the girl was asleep with her l1i'ad 
in defendant's lap would seem to nPgativt• am 
reckless disregard by the latter for her weli 
being. The assumed fact that def Pndant \1a, 
traveling 60 m.p.h. in a residential zonp was nril 
a fact that would indicate deft•ndant had knowl-
edge or any reason to believP that such ~pe1ri 
probably or even possibl>' would r0sult in a ligl1!cil 
cigarett<=• accid0ntally falling out of his month. 
Such an event as well could have occurred \1l1il: 
traveling 25 m.p.h. in any kind of wrath<:>r anrl 
in any speed zone. 1 t was not the sveed, hut tlw 
dropping of a lighted cigarette that resultt>d i11 
the loss of control, and this accidental and invol 
untary circumstance cannot be said to he willful 
miscondurt under an>' reasonahlP theory or hai1' 
of fact. 
"'Ne are aware of the principle that onlinar-
ily the matter of willful misconduct is a jun 
question, but not where the facts are such that 
reasonable minds could not conclude that deff:'n<l 
ant showed that type of intention or knowledgi· 
or indulged in that type of aggravated negligr1H·r· 
necessary to creat liability on account of \1·illfn! 
. cl t . t " nuscon uc m gues passenger cases. 
] 1 
In tli<· pn·s<'nt case the most that can be said of tlw 
dd'f'nd:int 's <·ornluct is that he failc•d to see tlw cement 
:ili11t111r•11t so as to avoid it. rl1 his Cf'rtainly do('S not prove 
1•1 i•n gro:-:;-; nPgligencr, to sa~y nothing of willful mis-
nndnc1 . 
. llilli.1;r1J1 ''· lforwar.d, 11 Utah 2d 7+, 355 P.2d 62 
, 111110) invnlv<•d a situation where the driver and guests 
fwd <·011;-;rn11Pd an unascertainable number of beers dur-
in'~· tit<• <'nning and while traveling at an approximatti 
spP1•rl (If :\;l rn;l<•s iwr hour tlw driver turnf'd his ]wad 
;111d sltnnldPr;-; to tlH' right to obtain a cigarette at which 
ti11ll' tlll· automohik• collided with a parked truck. The 
rrnh· 1' idenc·<· of intoxication othf'r than the consumption 
01· lw1·r Ji~- th<· driver was testimony of the investigating 
nl'ii«<'l' to tlH· r•ffrct the driver immediately after the 
r:c1·1(11·111 ap1wan•d to he under the influence of intoxi-
(':tl ing liquor. ll O\YPver, the plaintiff and the other guest 
te~tified tliat tlw driver appeared sober and up to the 
point of impad drovr in a n•asonahly prudent manner. 
Tl1is Comt lwkl that the evidencP \\·as insufficient to 
e11Jl1·ludP tliat tlw driver was intoxicated and wholly de-
fici1·nt in proving that intoxication was the proximatf' 
r·an,1· of 111<• aecidPnt. 
"11 a nm rd, in n•aching for tlw cigarette, took 
his <'Y<'S from the road and it was at thr precisP 
tinw that the accident occnrrtid. Taking ones eyes 
frn111 thP road under sueh circumstances is not 
iJ1('onsisknt \\·ith sohri<'t:v." 
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The court in intrrprt>ting the "willful misconduct'' Ja 11 
guage of the statute and holding that thP driwr's ai' 
in reaehing for a eigarette could not he com;tnwcl a~ 11 ill 
ful misconduct stated: 
""Willful miseonduct is the int<'ntional dr1 111 
of an act or in intentional omitting or failing 1: 
do an act, with knowledge that SPrions injun 1 
a probable, and not merely a possible resn!t, I'; 
the intentional doing of an act with one in 1wL 
less disregard of the possible eonse<gwnees. \\'ill 
ful misconduct cannot be predicatPcl upon rn1·1, 
inadvertence or even gross nPglig<)Jl('<'." 
In the present case, there was no claim that Dari1·, 
was intoxicated nor was there any f'viclern'e of <lPf P11 
dant's "wanton and reckless disregard of thr pos,iJil1· 
consequences." lie was only traveling at 20 to 23 rn1l1'' 
per hour (R. 79) over a well traveled route which Ji, 
himself had traveled many times before. (R. 70) In far·: 
it may well have been the safer route since> it elirninatiil 
a left turn on to the highway followed by a "e" t1111 1 
to double back to his destination and all this upon a hiKli 
way busy with holiday traffic. 
'This Court has indicatPd the degree of proof 11ec1·1 
sary to show willful misconduct in cases discut'~i1 1 .~ 
the negligent homicide statute, 41-G-43.10, U.C.A., 19:i;;, 
That statute applies to death caused by driving "in iwk 
less disregard of the safety of others." In State v. Berch-
told, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960), this Court in 
13 
,. 1 1 ing to the wording of the negligent homicide stat-
ii(i· .~1ated: 
'' .. Our statute only requires reckless dis-
regard for the safety of others, which is a much 
gn•atPr lack of care than ordinary negligence, 
hnt dot's not require as great a consciousness of 
th(' danger confronted as willful misconduct re-
quin_.d to create civil liability under our guest 
statute. 'l1o be 'reckless' does not require 'willful-
1wss' hut meam; rather heedless, careless and rash 
inadvertence to consequences." 
HreoYHY undPr the Guest Statute requires a "will-
l'ulne;;;s'' an intentional disregard. There is no evidrnrr 
nr· ,;;;u('ll int0ntion in the present rase. 
C'(•rtainl~r willfulness is not shown by the fact that 
Davies was traveling up the west side of the highway. 
Thl' rnntP sdected by Davies was not a part of the 
trnn·led portion of U. S. Highway 91. In fact it was 
prnt('ct1•d from traffic by the existence of steel light 
posts along tlw right edge of the southbound lanes. 
In E11yrnrt v. Borgeson, (Wash., 1962) 374 P.2d 
:1+3, Uw court was presented with the question whether 
tl1t> d('fernlant was guilty of willful or wanton misconduct 
in trnvPling to the left of a painted barrier in a lane re-
·'1'l'Yt'd for oneorning traffic. The court said: 
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''The most that can be said for the evidun1.1 
in this rr>cord is that the defendant driver ,10, 
negligent. 11lwre is a eom1Jlcte absPrn·e of ,1111 
proof that tlw defendant driver was th<> 'willfi; 
doer of wrong.' It may be admitted that he ]Ja~;s,r[ 
unlawfully and that such was a n0gligent ad, 1111 
such is not proof of an intention to hanu tk 
plaintiff. 'l1he eourt instrneted on wanton 111 i 
conduct with great reluctance, and onl~, UJion tli 
insistence of the plaintiff's counsel. It is irnp11; 
sible for anyone to say that there is anything 11 1 
the evidence by either party "·hich could <'hara1• 
terize the defendant husband's driving as PViw·i11~ 
an intention to inflict injury." 
In Sparrer v. K erspard, (Calif., 1939) 85 P.2u -tl!l, 
there was evidence that the driver was drivi11g lwynmi 
the speed limit and on thP ·wrong side of the road. ~1 111· 
court statPd: 
"After all of th<> evidence had hem tahn tl!i 
defendant made a motion that the jury lw din"dt"d 
to bring in a verdict in his favor. rriie trial comt 
denied the motion and the defendant clairns tl1 1 
trial court err<>d. \Ve think that claim is \11'1! 
founded. It must be conceded at once tliat tlu·11• 
was €~vidence that the defendant violatt>d 111 1 
statute prescribing the speed of motor vd1i(']t' 
and that he was driving on the wrong side of tlw 
road. But such facts, standing alon<', (lo not r·11n 
stitute willful rniscondurt 
"It is clear that the €~vidence does not rfo 
close that the def(>ndant, prior to mtpring tl 11 
curve where the accident occurred, knew, or slionl1'1 
15 
]w\'!' kno\Yn, of the dang<>rs in traversing it and 
t !l<'rdon• that th<> dt>f Pndant is not liahlP." 
Tlie "ond rt>f Prrt>d to another California case and quoted 
l: 111n its languag<> saying thP languagP was peruliarly 
;qqJll\'alil!' to th<• farts in the instant tase. 
"His conduct under the circumstances, con-
stituted, at most, gross n<'gligence. Upon the re-
cord now before us, it rannot be said that he pro-
('(•i>d<·d in utter disn'gard of, or that he was utter-
!>- indiff(•rf>nt to, tlw rights of his gtwsts. -While 
l1is judgment under the rireumstancPs confronting 
liilll, may have bePn poor, it does not appear that 
lH~ was wantonly recklPss in exposing his guests 
to dang<>r, nor did his conduct i1artake of tlH' 
n:itnrP of a willful, intentional wrong.'' 
Tl11• court "·0nt on "·ith rderPnr'<' to the cas0 hefor<' 
it ~a>·mg: 
"l~wn if it be assumed that the defendant 
knew or sl10uld have known of the curves on th<' 
rnad then being traveled, there is nothing in tl11" 
fads to indicate that he was conscious or should 
havP known that injury to his guest was a prob-
ahlP l'Psnlt so as to constitutP his actions ,,·illful 
misconduct, as dPfin0d in tlw <:a:ws f'ited l1Pl'('-
- " Ill . 
ThPn' is no evidt>nce in the present case that indi-
1·ati ~ Da\-if's was consrious or should have known that 
in1 11 1T to Hoylance was a prohahl<> r0sult of his actions. 
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K ilc L'. Kile, (Okla., 19~1()) ()3 P. 2d 75~~' invo]y1,d : 
situation wher0 tlw dt>frndant driver was using fr1.1 
wheeling and 'vas going very fast, tlw t<•stimony lH'in~ 
that he was traveling around 60 miles per hour; that thf' 
road was over mountainous country; that the <'ar wa> 
traveling south and was on the wrong side of the road 
at the time the accident happened; that the plaintiff li::d 
protested against the speed at which tlH'Y wen• tra1·1·l1u~ 
several times prior to the happening of tlH· aeei,J1·i11 
and that immediately after the accident tlu-' dPfPndm1t 
had said that he was driving too fast and should not 11m1 
hePn in free wheeling and did not have as good e1111 
trol of his car as he thoug·ht h<' had. 1'11<· comt poirn1'1i 
out at 7!54: 
•·rt will be observ<'<i from what has hP<'n ~a1il 
that the proof of plaintiff was clearly suffaienl 
to establish a violation h)' the defrndant of hot:, 
sections of the Colorado statute pleadPd hy plain 
tiff and that this would constitute negligern·t' Jll'l 
se and is sustained h)' the weight of authorit1 
'rhe plaintiff, hmYev<'r, in order to IW'OY1'1' 11.1 
reason of thP so-called guest statute, had to pron 
negligencP consisting of a willful and \rnnton rlii-
n•gard of th0 right of otlwrs.'' 
The court held there was not sufficirnt proof to ;;bm1 
willful and wanton disrPgar<l of tlw glwst's rigl1t:<. 
In McNoblc 11 • DrJ,nun·n~f, (Ore>., 1%0) 354 P. ~d ~0il, 
thp plaintiff and d<'fendant were> prorPP<ling W('st on :i 
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liigli 1rny upon which a truck was attempting to turn 
:irinmd aft<~r dumping a load of hot asphalt for a State 
Highway Commission patching crew. At the time o.f the 
qriih·nt, tlw truck completely blocked the westbound lane 
,jf the highway, and, according to a diagram drawn by 
11 statn J!Oliee officer, his truck extended to, and possibly 
nr:ross the et>nter line of the pavement, at right angles 
t11 tlH' line of traffic. 
'rlw plaintiff, a guest, predicated her claim that the 
dPfemlant was grossly negligent upon the following 
f'acts: 
Hu continued at 55 milt>s an hour after st>cing a 
cantion sign; 
He fail Pd to see the "One Way" sign described by 
nthPr \\·itnpses; 
HP fail<:>d to ser the flagman; and 
HP failrd to keep his automobile under control. 
Thr plaintiff contended that the combination of 
failme. to maintain a lookout, failure to decrease speed 
ctfter a warning, and failure to maintain contro·l added 
up to a eomhi11ation of acts of negligE>nce which present-
Pd a .Jnry question on gross negligence. 
The Oregon Supreme Court said: 
l~ 
"The driv<'r'8 lack of can~ fails to d(·i 1111 i1 str~t<' a foolhardy or 'I don't carp ·what hap111.11 
attitude. Befon• a seriPs or combination or n1.,, 
ligent acts may constitute gro8s rn~gligrnct-, t1 11 ~, 
must add up to a rPckless statP of mind. 
''From all the evidPnce most favorahlP to ti:, 
plaintiff, tlw cause of fop colli::;ion wa15 the l'aiJ 111 
of tlH_' host drivPr to SPP the flagman. For 11., 
purpose of reviewing tlw dirPeted verdid \\'1" a> 
8llllle that the flagman \\·as pro1wrly statioll1'1L 
an asumption, howevPr, which is not fn•t- fr111: 
serious quP8tion. But asmning that thP flag1nw1 
was propPrly iwrforrning his dut;.·, th<> host <lrir 
Pr's conduct amounts to defretivP lookout (·oupl,, 
with poor judgment. Poor judgmPnt, vi<'\H•d frr1111 
hindsight, is not Pnongh to constitntP g-ross !lP_~l 
g'Pnre. 
"TlwrP "·as no proof that DPLanna;.- had l1i, 
mind on anything hut hi1' driving. HP said lw ~,11 
thP caution sign, and startPd to slow dmrn wlw11 
he saw the truck, but did not thin!~ it 1rns 111•('1.' 
sary to stop until he saw the flagman. Tlit- 1·auc1 
of the aceidC'nt \\'a8 his failure to S<'P tlw flau:•ll<tl 1 
and to exPreise prudent judguwnt in tinw to c:tr11 1-
His failun' to sto·p or eontrnl his vehi('lt- an 1c1 
out of his failnn• to kN·p a stPadfast lookont. Tl1i-
<lefault was monwntar;.r inadveri <'nee. 
The trial judg(• <'OlTPctl:v allow<>d tlH· rnoti1111 
for the dirf'ctPd V(,l'dict in favor of tlw l1n,t 
drivf'r." 
The evidence in this casP sho.wecl that the plnintifi 
and the defendant were "good friends." Indeed, tlw rk-
fendant had stayed in the apartrnent of the plaintili 
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1111 n1 to the oeeurrence of the accident. On the day of the 
cll'"idf'llt, tl1e plaintiff and the defendant had spPnt the 
,11tnJ1oon togdher. At the time of the accident they were 
1.11 rnnte to the plaintiff's place of employment where 
i !w Jr·frmlant intended to drop tlw plaintiff while he 
pttrehasPd gasolin<> at Reed's Service Station. 
Then• is no dispute concerning the fact that the de-
1',.Hdant's <lriving on the day of the aceident and prior 
tJwrdo was in no way impropPr. There was a complete 
ah~·wnee of' an>• evidence of "showing off" or reckless 
c1inch1et, thrill sPeking or flirtation with dangPr, as typi-
fi<'·" the 11sual guest case. 
On th<> contrary, the evidence showed that the defen-
1lnnt stop1w<l at a stop sign on Riverside A venue pro-
!1•ding l'.S. 91, waited because traffic '"as heavy before 
def'iding to travel along the west side of U.S. 91 
to R(·pd's Service Station, a distance of only about 300 
ftct. (Th(• evidence showed that the accident occnrred 
ahnut 18~) f e<>t from Riverside A vPnue and that the 
>t't'\'iet· station "-as only 100 feet further on). 
1'he route selected by the defendant was no·t a part 
of tl1(• trnvelPd portion of U.S. 91. In fact, it was pro-
i1't'l!'!l from traffic by the existence of light posts at 
11Prio<i.ic intervals along the right edge of the highwa~'>'. 
lt was, however, a well traveled way, characterized h>' 
1h1" inVf'st igating officer as "used <>xknsivel~v for ve-
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hicular traffic." (R. 87) This route had been followedL·. 
the defendant on many occasions as it was his cu~1i 111 
to purchase his gasoline at Reed's Service and he 01 
dinarily took Riverside Avenue from his residenc·e ii. 
South Orem. 
The area was well lighted and widc•r than the tra1 
eled portion of U.S. 91. The plaintiff himself had dri 11 ,. 
along this route in the opposite direction prior to :11, 
accident as did other traffic going to and from thp par~ 
ing lot for Norton's Food Ct>ntPr. 
The defendant's alternative to what he di<l wa~ 1" 
wait until heavy traffic had cleared in both diredion.\ 
travel north well past his intended destination, half \li1 
up the hill, before the br<:>ak in the paint<:>d lim·s woul1, 
have permitted him to make a ·'TT" tnrn and rPtnrn souil. 
to the Nugget. 
There is nothing about th<:> accidPnt its<>lf to irnlira11 
willful misconduct. The cause of the eollision was tl11 
striking of the abutment. There was adequatP <listanr'1 
between the wooden telephone pole and the stet•l ligl1! 
pole to permit the passage of automobiles. The strikin~ 
of the abutment threw the defendant's automohile nut 
of control into the light pol<:> at approximately a -J.5 ik 
gree angle. 
The only evidence of willful misconduct claimed h1 
the plaintiff was accelerating rapidly, suffici<:>nt to thni\I 
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~;~m·l and j<'rk his head backward and driving along 
tlw \\est <·dµ;<' of lT.S. I lighway 91, that is, in tlw wrong 
dil'f'dion. 'l'lie evidence, hm\'('Ver, showed that the point 
lrom whieh the defendant startPd was on an up-hill grade 
:Li1d that thPre was loose grawl on the roadway. The 
J1i.!.dwst :-:1 H'<'d disclosed by the evidence was between 20 
,wd ~3 miles per hour. Oncoming traffic was in no way 
111FiiVPrt. 
To sa_\· that this rises to tht> level of willful miscon-
rl11et is to e>11rnsculafo the gu<·st statute and wholy frns-
lrnt!· its purposPs. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S TRAVELING ALONG THE WEST 
qnE OF lJ.S. HIGHWAY 91 IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION 
\\'AS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
ThC' plaintiff's theory of this case was that "the de-
fendant digressed from the regularly traveled portion of 
11w rnad, and drovP off the regular trawled portion of 
i.lw mad 011 the wPst side of U.S. 91 into a steel utility 
jll)lP." ( f nstnwtion :\o. :2.) 
1t i1-: obvious that statutes reqmnng v<>hiclPs to 
trny1·l on tliP right-hand sidP of tlw roadway an• int.•rnl<'d 
'1(1 1'!'1-,111lat<' traffic. Traffic was in no way involwd in 
lltis (·asP. J t must be equally obvious that the d(•fendant's 
striking th0 pol0 had nothing to do ,,-ith tlw dir('di11J 111, 
which he was traveling. 
The law does not concern itself with cause and "ff1.1.1 
in a philosophical sense. That the accident would n11, 
have occurred "but for" the defendant's having li1·11 
where he was does not establish "proximate causP.'' TJi,. 
familiar law school illustration is that of the man dri1 
ing across New Jersey at an 0xcessive rate of speed,,, 
as to arrive in Philadelphia in time to be struek 1,1 
lightning. His speed was not a proximate cause, 1'\1 11 
thought the accident would not havP oceurred "hut f,,~· 
his excessivP spPe<l. 
In 60 C.J.S. 658, (Motor Vehicles, ~281) it is ,r.:1111i 
"Proximate causP. The operation of a mot11 
vehicle on an improper place or in an impro1w: 
position on the highway or street does not r1111 
stitute actionable or contributory negligenc1· 111 1 
less such operation was a proximate causP ol' tl:1 
injury. Hence the nwre fact that a motor wl1itlr 
was being operated u1mn, or partially upon, t! 11 
wrong side of thP highway or str'l'et at tht> tiw" 1" 
an accident, or shortly prior thereto, or in yinh: 
tion of a rule requiring motorists to drivP in th 
right-hand lane or as rn~ar to tlH3 right-hand l'i11i1 
as possible or practicablP, or in the wrong di1w-
tion on a one-way str0et, do<>s not fix liahilit~: 111: 
the owner or operator for, or establish contrilrn-
tory neglig0nce precluding his recovery for, 111 
juries which were not proximately caused by ll 11 
viofation of t110 rnle of the:> road.'' 
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In JJolin, ct al. v. Kimmclman, 295 Pa. 801, H5 A. 
::ill (I!):!!)) tl1P (•vidence :-:how eel that the ddf'ndant, drOVf' 
Iii." 1·;1 r 1·a~t on liI orris Street to Fifth Stred, and thence 
1111 'Jll·d south on Fifth StrePt which had heen declared a 
1i1i1·-11 a.\' :-:1 n•d for northbound traffic, where the car 
. :1Jri1· in contact ,\-ith the minor plaintiff, and quite ser-
i:111~Jy i11jurc•d him. The evidence was cunflicting a:-; to 
1, i11•1lwr tlw aeeid(·nt happened at Morris Street or in 
rk ii1i1ldk of the blo<::k south. rro all intents and purposes 
;1 wa:-: a darting-out case, bnt as there was evidencP that 
tlw a<'cid1·nt happenPd at the crossing and negative evi-
rlr'lll'f' nf tlw ]a('k of warning, together \Yith a city ordin-
:1111·1•. 1rndPr 'd1ieh Fifth Sh't>Pt was dPclarPd a onP-way 
.,trel't for northbound traffir, tlw trial jndp;P snhmittPd 
:J,,, 1·n:<P to tl11• jnr~v. 
Tl11• :ip1wllate rourt said: 
"\Vhil<> moving· against the current of traffic 
is a eircnmstance to be considered with other evi-
<1«11c<', standing alone it does not establish negli-
g1•11e<'. * "' * l\f oreover, the proximate canst> of the 
arei<l1·nt "'as the boy coming in contact with the 
1·:ir, and not the dirertion in whirh it was moving." 
In lf11l1er n_ A11dPrso11, 355 Pa. 2-1:7, l-1: A. 2d GSS 
11:1+1; ), tlw dPfrndant, trawling at an Pxcessive rate of 
'Ji1·1•1l on 1 lw lPft sid1• (wrong sidt>) of tlw road, struck 
' 1 "hild on a :-:l('d approaching at a right angl<> from <le-
fi·ndant\; ]pft, rf1hp court, in affirming a judg1rn•nt for 
tf.,. rll·l'1·11dant not\\·ithst:mding thP V<'nlid, said: 
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"The fact that th(~ drivPr was on thP lPft 
of the road ... does not in itself establish ner•J 
ge~c~ unless his position on that side wa~ '(1 
eff1c1ent cause of th<• accident." 
In Dickson v. Lzicor, (Iowa, 1920) 225 N.W . .fOG, tJi,. 
plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by a tnlC'k as ]
1
,. 
crossed an alley on the sidewalk while the truck 11 ,1 
making an illegal left turn into the alley. The tri1, 
court charged the jury that the- def Pndant was neglig1"11 
in driving on the wrong side of thP stre-et, that is, ]i.f( ,1 
the center linP in vio.Jation of law. 
The Supreme Court said that thP pnrposr of tl11 
statute was to protPd people on the- left-hand sidC> of 1:,, 
road to keep traffic moving, and that the defondani. 
driving on the wrong side of the road was not a r1rw 
mate cause of thP accident as it did not occur in thP r1 
hicular po·rtion of thP roadway. A judginPnt in favor P 
the plaintiff was rPvPrsP<l 
Tht> proximatP cause of this accident was the d1· 
fendants failure to observe the abutment. Thr dirPC'lH 1;: 
of his travel had nothing whatever to do ·with this. Sta: 
utes requiring automobiles to be drivPn on the right lwi 
of the roadway have as their purpose protection frri::. 
oncoming traffic, not from objects in the roadway. 
Accordino·lv even if it he concPded that driYing '' b • 
the left half of a roadway is evidence of willful misron 
ti 
11 
n 
duct, it would not support the vPrdict in this case. .n 
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POINT III 
THE CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF AS A MATTER 
or Lc\W CONSTITUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
1111 AS'.-'ll:MPTION OF RISK. 
Tl!(' plaint if'£ had known the defendant for sOll1(c) 
r. 11 1w prior to thP aceidPnt. He had spent the afternoon 
11111111'd1ah•l)· prior to tlw accident riding in an automobile 
1L·i,·1·11 h.\· 1lw plaintiff. He had eonsmrwd alcoholic lwv-
' rag1•c; \\1th the defendant. 'l1here is, hm\·ever, no evi-
.[1'llC'I' of' mi\thing <'XC1'pt complete acqui(•scence in every-
l11inc'.· tlt1· dPl'<•ndant did i11rnw(liatel)· Jll'<'C<'ding the arci-
1]1·n t 
T!JP plaintiff centends that there was a sudden 
cpmt of \\·illf'nl misconduct and that he did not have an 
11p1111rtnnit:-· to prntl'st. This is contrary to the physical 
··1·i<l1'lll'I'. lt is manifest that it would have tak<'n at least 
!t: ~"1·m11b for th<> clefrndant to have reached tlw place 
1rhun• t 111· acci(l(•nt occnrred, \d1ich is more than amp]P 
limP for anyon<' dPsiring to make a profost to say some-
thing-. Tile' clear fact emPrgPs that tlw plaintiff found 
1111tliing- oli.i('ctionahle with thP driving of the defendant 
nntil art1'r hP had had an opportunity to consid(•r his 
1 1 1i~lit and possihlP solntinns. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
.f]P._y 
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Instruction No. 2 as givt>n hy tl10 court sd fort Ii tJ. 
plaintiff's theory of the case and delineakd his elaiin,, 
willful misconduct. rrhis instruction set forth no oth1 
theory than that the defendant had driven on OH· ,1", 
side of the highway. This as a matter of law dol'~ 11 ,, 
constitute willful misconduct and as a matter of law 11 a, 
not the proximate <'ausp of thP arcidPnt. 
If Instruction No. 2 was not plaintiff's tlworr ,, 
the case then Instruction No. + as given by thP cni11 
permitted the jury to base a finding of willful miseonrlt1i 
upon any ground they might choose. 1'here wa8 no d1· 
lineation by the court of tht> specific acts of willfu! w;,, 
conduct to be considered by tlw jury. Ratlwr, tlw instiw 
tion was so broad as to be tantamount to submitting· tJ, 
case to tht> jury without instrnction as TO tlw appliealiJ,. 
law. 
In Holmes v. IleidclJracht, 10 rtah 2d 7-t, 3-1-.S P.: 
5()5 (19()0), .Justic<-' l\frDonongh said: 
"One of the most common f alacies attt>rnlrn11 
upon our system of formulating instructio~~ an1! 
taking exceptions and assigning error with ri 
spect thereto is that courts attempt to so des1gl' 
them that thev \vould be univPrsallv appliC'al1 11 : 
and th<>n losing counsel uses all possfble i11gr,1111it 
to imagine situations in which instruciions \\·oui< 
not be applicablt>. It is much lwttt>r that thr in 
structions be design<'d to cnver the specific W 
situation." (Emphasis added.) 
1: 
t: 
I 
Ii· 
in· 
1111 
ill:'t nl<'tion No. 5 as giwn by the court states that the 
,]f'i'en11ant \\'as doing an unlawful act without further 
i·:;planatio11. Tlw jury was not told whether this was 
1ril!ful 111isronduct, evidenc!:' of willful misconduct or 
1,J 1at. f-ilwh a vague instruction merely invites the jury 
ii', 11111·l11dP that being in the wrong side of the road was 
proof of willful misconduct even though it is not con-
r·ln:-iY" proof Pven of negligence. 
Jn tlH' ('US<' of Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 
~11 ilO, :~% l). 2d m (1964) the defendant contended that 
nnrl('r tlw facts tlw leaving of the truck unattended in 
nnlation of a state statute constituted proof as a matter 
l)f h11v that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence and 
that it proximately contributed to cause his own injury. 
Tlll eomt stat0d: 
'•\VP are aware that it has sometimes been 
:'tat<'d as a general rule that violation of a statu-
tor~· standard of care is negligence as a matter of 
la\\'. This is indeed a sound rule, but like all gen-
Pralitit'S, it has its limitations, and is applicahlr 
nn]y und<'r proper circumstances." 
Tn this cast> the jury was giwn gem'ral instructions 
<111d i11 fm·111Pcl of a provision of the traffic code hut not 
it:- lr>gal <>ff ect. Ev<>n if this case is on<> for thP jury, a 
11 1 \r trial is n0cc'ssary to prevent manifest injustic<>. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case is immfficient to snpp!iri: 
finding of willful misconduct. The evidP11c<~ shO\n•d tlw 
the plaintiff's injuries were tlw result of the acci<l!'lli: 
striking of an abutment which was barely visiable. TJ
1 
defendant could not in any sense be said to haw 1i1,, 
aware of the prohalJility of injury in elPcting to do a 
act which he had done on numerous prior occasion~ wit!, 
out untoward result. 
Defendant's driving on the west sid<~ of lJ.S. 91, n, 
a matter of law was not a proximate> causc• of thP vln111 
tiff's injuries. All otlwr acts, conduct, and lwhavior r 
the defendant were assnnwd hy thP plaintiff. 
If the guest statute has any vitality, it is a bar\,, 
this action. The facts of this case describe thr da~iw 
guest case - one friend giving another a rick• to \\"111/, 
The evidence is barren of even a suspicion of willfn]nP~' 
This verdict should he set aside and judgrnrnt ~n 
tered in accordance with tlw defenclant's motion for,[, 
rerte<l verdict. 
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